CO129-497 - Public Offices - 1926 — Page 362

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5. It will be seen from the above that upon rice and firewood depends the success of the whole project.

RICE.

6. A great part of the Chinese rice consumed in Canton comes from the Eastern district of the Kuang-Tung province and is transported to Canton in junks and launches by the creeks and small rivers which exist in this district, in addition to the Chinese rice imported by sea from other parts of China.

Canton is the port of a populous sub-tropical province whose population has been long accustomed to inland water transport, the organisation of which-poor though it may be is already in native hands. It is probable that, if from no loftier motives than high prices, the inhabitants will make an effort to supply whatever Canton lacks. In the Delta, too, there are numerous junk barbours which may be possible sources of difficulty, while Macao, although of no commercial importance, is already the resort of several accomplished smugglers and consummate masters of every form of maritime roguery.

7. It would appear that naval measures in the estuary would be unable to stop completely supplies of rice to Canton, and that, in spite of the difficulties of land transport, which are referred to in paragraph 9 below, a certain quantity of rice might perhaps be brought in overland from the immediately surrounding districts. The crux of the matter is the nature of the latest rice crop. If there is an ample crop, a sufficient quantity will find its way through to support the population of Canton. If the crop is a poor one-a not unlikely event, in view of the country having been overrun by various armies during the past four years-Canton will be badly hit by naval measures in the estuary. In this connection it may be desirable to point out that, since rice cannot be stored for longer than three or four months without deteriorating, a limiting factor is placed on the food value of stocks accumulated to meet the situation we are now considering. On the other hand, however, there are at least two rice crops annually.

FIREWOOD.

8. Supplies of firewood coming down the West River from Kuang-Hsi province If it were feasible to station a gunboat to Canton must pass through Wu-chou. between the latter place and Canton, she could completely cut off supplies-a measure which would cause serious bardship, but we have not examined, from a technical point of view, this question, or that of her maintenance up-river.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF Transport.

9. The provinces of Kuang-Hsi and Kuang-Tung are conspicuous for the absence of efficient railways and roads. We are informed by Sir Reginald Stubbs that the Samshui-Canton line is out of order and that the Canton-Shao-Chou line has ceased to function. There are no roads inland, and transport of goods across country is rendered impossible by the nature both of the ground and of the brigands which infest it. Further, even the incentive of increased wages for cartage of goods would be unlikely to attract the necessary coolie labour, in view of the fact that under the conditions contemplated payment would be uncertain. For the above reasons we may safely assume that transport by water is the only practical method.

EXPORTS.

The result of completely 10. The principal export of Canton is raw silk. stopping what is left of this trade must be considered as a part of the general effect of the blockade.

Sir Reginald Stubbs was of the opinion that a blockade would be of little effect unless the merchant class were at the time in a position to exercise influence. If that were so, they might exert sufficient pressure-both political and economic on the Government to induce them to resume normal relations with the outside world.

Sir Reginald was quite clear that similar motives would not operate if the labouring classes were in power, since the effect of the blockade would not be sufficiently direct, though the reasons for his opinion were not so obvious. They seemed to be that the labouring classes would be able to get on somehow in spite of the Indeed, he blockade, and that the hardships inflicted might only enrage them. contemplated as an almost certain result that Canton would be burnt to the ground unless the labouring classes could be restrained. Further, an effective blockade would undoubtedly destroy the export profits of the merchants and probably reduce them to ruin. If this happened, since they were playing the part of milch cows to the Canton Government, it seemed not unlikely that the latter would clear out the moment they found that the source of their exactions had run dry. So that the present position of the merchants-both political and financial might prove an essential factor in the problem of what would be the effect of the blockade. On this point Sir Reginald said that he was unable to give any trustworthy information, as he had been away from the country too long. He suggested that on this and other points further information might be sought from H.M. Consul-General at Canton.

FINANCIAL MEASURES.

11. A note by Mr. Hawtrey on this subject is attached as Appendix No. 2. It will be seen that even if a state of war existed, little could be done, and without a state of war, practically nothing.

THE POSITION OF THE SHAMEEN IN THE EVENT OF THE INSTITUTION OF A BLOCKADE. 12. The question arises as to whether restrictive measures could be applied without previously evacuating the long-established foreign community on the Shameen as well as missionaries throughout the Delta. Such a step would inevitably give a warning which might to some extent stultify our plans. A 'less obvious result of evacuation would be the difficulty in inducing the colony to return, once the ties of three generations were broken, and all real estate ravaged (as it might be), and burnt. It is certain, too, that the Chinese would oppose our former privileges, so much so that it is doubtful, whatever the result, whether we should ever win them back. Claims would also arise from injured foreign interests, not the least of which would come from the British section of the Canton-Kowloon railway.

13. In the opinion of Sir Reginald Stubbs, it is impossible to forecast the attitude of the Canton Government towards the Shameen in the event of the institution of a blockade, but the foreign community could hardly be left without the protection of a force sufficiently strong to ensure its safety and the maintenance of supplies from Hong Kong. Sir Reginald put this force at half a Company of Indian troops. It is right to add that in his judgment the Shameen itself and the buildings thereon are of little value, though everything should be done to protect the lives of the foreign community.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.

14. (1) A blockade of Canton, undertaken with prior international agreement, will be sufficiently effective to cause the Canton Government to give way, if-

(a.) The latest rice crop has been a poor one.

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(b.) In addition to the seaward approaches, the whole delta is patrolled and the West River blocked by a gunboat stationed between Wu-Chou and Canton.

(o.) The Canton merchant, as opposed to the labouring class, is in power at the

time.

If either of the first two conditions are not fulfilled the effectiveness of the blockade will be reduced accordingly, and if the third is not fulfilled, in the opinion of Sir Reginald Stubbs, the blockade would probably be ineffective.

(2.) Such financial measures as can be taken will have an almost negligible effect. (3.) The foreign community on the delta should either be evacuated before action is taken, and the increased difficulty in carrying out our plans be accepted, or

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A telegram of enquiry on this subject has been despatched by the Department of Overseas Trade.

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